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Summary
The economic reform programme in China, which started in the late 1970s, has had a major impact on rural
health services. The replacement of collective agricultural production by the ‘household responsibility
system’, lead to the widespread collapse of collective-funded Co-operative Medical Schemes (CMSs), which
at that time assisted farming households with health care costs in more than 90% of villages in rural China.
The design and implementation of new forms of CMS which are compatible with the economic reform has
become a central focus of rural health policy. With strong political support from the central government,
which has proposed that most rural areas should have such schemes in place by 2000, widespread CMS
implementation is proceeding at considerable speed. Effective regulation, based on systematic monitoring and
evaluation methodologies will be essential if these new schemes are to be sustainable. This paper examines
the issues involved using empirical evidence from an evaluation based on the logical framework approach of
an experimental scheme which was initiated in Hechi Prefecture, Guangxi Province in 1995.
The study findings suggest that the very restricted forms of CMS now being introduced on a widespread
basis to meet government targets may have some merit in terms of the organisation and regulation of health
services and could represent a valuable first step towards a viable financing option. However, the focus on
village based schemes, with minimal levels of funding and consequent inability to provide assistance with
drug costs or treatment at higher level facilities, raises considerable doubts as to their sustainability when the
current enthusiastic support provided by local government declines. The case study reinforces the point that
the establishment of a CMS can do little to overcome basic deficiencies in service provision. It also indicates
that such schemes will not solve the problem of access for the poorest households in the absence of specific
and effective mechanisms to finance their inclusion.
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41   INTRODUCTION
The economic reform programme in China, which started in the late 1970s, has had a major impact on rural
health services. Though aggregate health resources have gradually increased, there have been considerable
problems in terms of the financing and organisation of services. The replacement of collective agricultural
production by the ‘household responsibility system’, drastically reduced financial support for Co-operative
Medical Schemes (CMSs), which at that time assisted farming households with health care costs in more than
90% of villages in rural China (Feng et al. 1995). Most collapsed, and farmers had to pay for medical care
out of their own pockets on a fee-for-service basis. With the rapid increases in the cost of medical services
through the 1980s, many farmers, especially those in poorer areas, had difficulty in obtaining even basic
health care (Gu et al. 1993 ).
By the late 1970s, rural China had established a highly structured, ‘three-tiered’ health service. Around
85% of villages had a health station staffed by ‘barefoot doctors’, mainly farmers who received a short
training and then worked part-time to provide basic curative and preventive care in return for payments from
collective funds. Townships had a health centre that provided referral services and supervised preventive
activities, and at county level there was a hospital and specialised institutions that organised preventive
programmes. These higher level services were mainly funded by government. After 1978, village level
collective funding largely ceased, the number of health stations run by village collectives rapidly declined and
most of the barefoot doctors effectively became private practitioners. In addition, higher level facilities were
required to seek an increasing share of their funding from fee incomes (Bloom and Gu, 1997).
The establishment of new health financing systems is regarded as a key issue for health sector reform in
China. In rural areas, the CMS approach is seen as having played an important role in providing access to
basic health services at a reasonable cost and the design and implementation of new forms of CMS which are
compatible with the economic reform has become a central focus of policy. With strong political support
from the central government, which has proposed that most rural areas should have such schemes in place by
2000 (Chinese Communist Party and State Council, 1997), widespread CMS implementation is proceeding
at considerable speed. For example, in Hechi Prefecture, Guangxi Province, where the current exercise is
based, it is intended that 30% of villages will be covered by new CMSs by the end of 1997, and 100% by
2000. Effective regulation, based on systematic monitoring and evaluation methodologies will be essential if
these new schemes are to be sustainable. This present paper aims to provide empirical evidence on this issue
using material from the evaluation of an experimental scheme carried out in 1995-1996.
The implementation of experimental schemes was part of a collaborative research programme between
Shanghai Medical University and the United Kingdom Institute of Development Studies. In 1993 and 1994, a
baseline survey was conducted in three poor counties in the western part of China: Donglan county in
Guangxi province, Shibing county in Guizhou, and Xunyi county in Shaanxi. This survey aimed to collect
data on socio-economic conditions, population, health resources, and health service provision and utilisation.
The data came from routine reports submitted by health facilities, a household interview survey, focus group
5discussions and key informant interviews. In 1996, at the request of local officials, two experimental CMSs
were implemented, one in Wuzhuan township in Donglan, and the other in Yuandi township in Xunyi. This
paper draws on an initial evaluation the Wuzhuan CMS to discuss the possibilities and limitations of such
schemes. Section 2 provides a description of the scheme. Section 3 discusses evaluation methodologies and
section 4 presents the results. Finally, section 5 summarises the major outcomes of the scheme, and raises
general policy issues.
2   THE CO-OPERATIVE MEDICAL SCHEME IN WUZHUAN TOWNSHIP
2.1   Location
Donglan is located in the north-western part of Guangxi province. It occupies a total area of 2465 square
km., of which 94 per cent is mountainous. Arable land per capita is only 0.64 mu (0.043 hectare). Donglan is
a nationally designated poor county. In 1992, the average rural net per capita income was ¥326, only one
third of the national rural average level (State Statistical Bureau 1995). In 1993, among 148 administrative
villages of Donglan, there were 104 rural health workers, mostly private practitioners, and only 8 officially
designated village health stations.
Within Donglan, Wuzhuan is a comparatively rich township, with an average rural net income per capita
of 756 yuan in 1993. Almost all the rural population were employed in the agricultural sector, with most rural
households reliant on rice production. There were few off-farm employment opportunities. The health centre
at Wuzhuan was staffed by 26 doctors and workers. Among nine administrative villages, there were seven
rural doctors, all private practitioners.
2.2   Findings of the 1993-1994 baseline survey
The baseline survey in Donglan indicated that village level health services gave considerable cause for
concern. The percentage of the population reporting illness but not visiting a health worker was higher than
the average level in poor rural China, and ‘financial difficulty’ was the most common reason given. Health
providers earned their income almost entirely from the sale of drugs. They were in general not willing to
undertake preventive care activities, given what they regarded as insufficient incentives provided by the
county health bureau. They also maintained minimal records. Typically there was no registration of outpatient
visits, and no prescriptions or invoices for fees were provided.
2.3   Design of the CMS
The main findings of the baseline survey were reported at meetings in Donglan which included
representatives of cadres, health professionals, and farmers. They requested assistance to design and
implement a CMS which would cover primary health care costs, with particular emphasis on outpatient
services, immunisation, and maternal care at village level. It was seen as of great importance for local people
to have access to good basic health care services in their own villages, given the considerable difficulties
6involved in travelling in this mountainous region. Wuzhuan township was selected as the site for
implementation of an initial experimental scheme.
Researchers from Shanghai Medical University designed a number of possible CMSs with varying
service coverage, premiums and reimbursement ratios. Based on data from the baseline survey (see appendix
1), they recommended a premium of ¥9 per person per year, with ¥1 provided from county funds and ¥8 from
individuals. This was intended to cover free immunisation, free maternal care, and partial reimbursement of
the cost of outpatient services at village level and, on referral, at the township health centre. However, cadre
members and health professionals in Donglan and Wuzhuan feared that individuals would be reluctant to pay
¥8, around 1% of per capita income in 1993. It was decided by the head of the township government that the
individual contribution should be reduced to ¥4, and in consequence that outpatient care at township level
should be excluded. Donglan County Government agreed to the proposal that they should contribute ¥1 to a
preventive care fund for each member of the CMS.
As indicated above, the income of village health workers in Wuzhuan derived mainly from drug sales.
Under Ministry of Health regulations, they could retain a mark-up of 10-15% on the cost of Western drugs,
and 20-25% on that of traditional Chinese drugs. In general, drug fees account for around 90% of outpatient
fees at village level (Gu and Yu 1995). In order to decrease the reliance on drugs and encourage health
workers to provide more consultations and simple treatments, for example of minor injuries, the researchers
and local health authorities agreed that the profit from drug selling should be decreased after implementation
of the CMS, and that registration and treatment fees would be fully reimbursed. The authorities also decided,
against the advice of some researchers, that injection fees would be reimbursed, given the local preference for
injections over oral drugs. This so-called ‘three-fees’ approach to CMS has been widely adopted throughout
rural China.
2.4   Key points of the CMS (for details see appendix 1)
The proposed CMS thus had the following main features:
· Principles: not-for-profit, voluntary membership, multiple assistance, democratic management.
· Fund sources: county and township government, village collective, individual households.
· Membership: open to all rural households in Wuzhuan. Membership is by the household as a unit to
reduce adverse selection between people of different sexes, ages, and health situations.
· Premium: ¥5 per member, with ¥4 from individuals and ¥1 from county government; township
government and village collective to pay premiums for extremely poor households.
· Services covered and reimbursement: free registration, treatment and injection fees at village level; free
immunisation for members no more than seven years old; free maternal care for pregnant women
members, including prenatal and postnatal care, and delivery.
· CMS management: committee established at township level with members from township government
departments and health facilities; one full-time management cadre.
7· Controlled drug supply: village doctors are only allowed to buy drugs from the township health centre;
drugs are purchased and sold at fixed prices.
· Village doctor management: prescriptions must be handed to the township CMS management committee
for examination and reimbursement of the three-fees; one third of the difference between wholesale and
retail price of drugs will be paid to the committee which will redistribute the money to village doctors at
the end of the year as a performance bonus.
2.5   Implementation
In the autumn of 1995, the Hechi Prefecture Health Bureau made funds available to support the establishment
of village health stations and to begin preparations for the establishment of the CMS in Wuzhuan. Following
the summer harvest, cadre members from the prefecture and county health bureaux went to Wuzhuan to
publicise the CMS, explain its operation, and encourage farmers to participate. From September, farmers
started to pay their share of the premiums. Most paid in cash, while a small number were allowed to hand
over a corresponding amount of grain.
There were a total of seven private practitioners in the nine villages of Wuzhuan. Because such
practitioners usually work only in their own village, three villages, Luanpo, Dongli, and Hongli, which had
no health workers, were not included in the CMS. Another village, Zhonghe, is very close to Wuzhuan town
and their private practitioner had his clinic there, only five minutes walk from the township health centre.
Given the complications this would have introduced, this village was also excluded. Private practitioners in
Shangxu, Linle, Baxue, and Lale villages were all willing to follow the regulations of the CMS and
supported its implementation. One of two private practitioners in Nalie village was selected by the CMS
management committee for inclusion in the scheme, while the other was allowed to continue in practise as
previously. All five selected private practitioners signed contracts with the committee and each of them made
available one room of their own houses as a village health station. Donglan County Health Bureau drew up
management regulations, and put them on the wall of each station. They also printed special prescription
forms and invoices to be used within the CMS (appendix 2).
Wuzhuan CMS management committee was established by the Township People's Government, with its
head acting as director. Committee members were recruited from township government departments. A full
time official, paid by Donglan County People's government, is in charge of routine management, and the
accountant of Wuzhuan Township Health Centre is employed by the committee on a part time basis. In each
of the five villages where the CMS was implemented, a CMS management group was organised. This group
consisted of the head of the village, the village accountant, a village woman cadre and representatives chosen
by villagers.
82.6   Monitoring and evaluation
Following the implementation of the CMS in November 1995, researchers from Shanghai Medical University
visited Wuzhuan every three months to monitor the intervention. They gathered information on the utilisation
of village health stations and fees paid, use of the CMS fund, CMS management activities, and attitudes of
village cadres, health workers and villagers to the scheme. They also conducted an initial evaluation study in
January 1997. Quantitative data were collected through a household interview survey and a health facility
survey, while qualitative data were obtained from focus group discussions and key informant interviews.
The logical framework approach was adopted in the evaluation study. This views any project as having
four basic components: inputs which produce outputs which aim to achieve a specific purpose which will
assist in the attainment of a development goal (Coleman 1987, McLean 1988). In the present case, the staff,
equipment, and funds necessary for the design and implementation of the CMS are treated as project inputs.
The output is the CMS itself, which was intended to achieve a number of purposes: increased access to
outpatient care at village level, increased access to preventive care, and reduced cost of outpatient care. The
goal of the project might be expressed as 'reducing ill-health and suffering among the rural population, while
lightening the burden of medical fees'. A key element of the logical framework is the definition of a detailed
set of measurable indicators to assess project success or failure (McLean 1988). The indicators used to
measure use of inputs, production of outputs and attainment of purposes in the CMS evaluation are set out in
figure 1. Goal attainment can only be properly assessed in the longer term.
3   EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
3.1   The household survey
It was decided to focus the evaluation study on villages which had been covered in the baseline survey of
1994. The sample selected for this survey included three villages in Wuzhuan, with 100 households randomly
sampled in each. However, only two of these villages, Shangxu and Nalie, were included in the CMS while
the third, Luanpo, was excluded because of the absence of a health worker. Follow-up interviews in these two
villages were carried out in April 1996 and January 1997, and a total of 186 households were interviewed on
all three occasions. Of these, only 56 were found to be covered by the CHCS. To increase the range of CHCS
members in the evaluation, an additional 100 households covered by CHCS in each village were randomly
sampled. Thus, in January 1997, 386 households were interviewed, of which 256 were CHCS members. The
sampled population was 1663, with 1002 CHCS members and 661 non-CHCS members.
The baseline survey in 1994, collected data on five areas:
· Household size, assets, income, expenditure, distance to the nearest health facility, and expenditure on
medical care in 1993.
· For each household member: name, sex, nationality, age, educational level, marital status, occurrence of
illness during the previous two weeks, use of hospital care in 1993, occurrence of, and reason for, non-
admission to hospital in spite of referral by a doctor.
9· For those who reported at least one episode of illness during the last two weeks: days of sick leave, days
in bed due to illness, number of visits to a health worker, expenditure on out-patient care, non-use of
needed services, and reason for any non-use of services.
· For those admitted in hospital in 1993: number of admissions, level of health facility, days of stay in
hospital, result of diagnosis, and health status on leaving facility.
· For child-bearing married women: pregnancy, delivery of baby, ante natal services used, and contraceptive
methods adopted.
The follow-up interviews in 1996 and 1997 gathered similar information on sickness and health service
utilisation, and also included questions on CMS membership, satisfaction with the CMS or reasons for non-
participation, number of visits with fees reimbursed, and amount of reimbursement. The head of the
household, or spouse in their absence, was interviewed by a student from the county health school, who had
received 2-3 days training provided. Members of the research team were responsible for supervising and
monitoring the quality of the survey in the field and checked each completed questionnaire. If errors and
inconsistencies were found the household was re-interviewed. Computer data entry and consistency checking
was carried out by medical school students under the supervision of the researchers.
3.2   Other evaluation activities
In addition to the household survey, a number of additional studies were undertaken. The five village health
stations covered by CMS were investigated to collect data on the number of outpatient visits, total and
composition of fees collected, and the income earned by village doctors from these services. The researchers
also conducted surveys in county and township preventive facilities to obtain information on immunisation
and maternal care coverage rates. A study of CMS management collected data on fund revenues and
expenditures, the possession and use of CMS cards, and management costs, including payments for
management cadres.
A series of focus group discussions and key informant interviews were undertaken with relevant
government officials, health workers, management cadres and farmers. These ascertained their opinions as to
the successes and failures of the CMS, how management might be improved, and the willingness of farmers
to remain in the scheme in the following year.
4   RESULTS
As described above, the evaluation was based around a predetermined logical framework The completed
version of this framework is presented in figure 2.
10
4.1   Staffing
At each of the five villages within the CMS, one rural doctor was contracted to provide health services. These
services were available to all villagers, irrespective of membership in the scheme. One staff member from
Donglan County Anti-Epidemic Station was allocated to assist in maintaining the cold-chain for vaccines,
and a preventive health worker of Wuzhuan Township Health Centre was given overall responsibility for the
immunisation programme for children under seven years old. A doctor from Donglan County MCH Station
organised maternal care services with assistance from the obstetrician at Wuzhuan Township Health Centre.
CMS management organisations were established at both township and village level. Most members of
the management teams were part-time with the exception of one cadre who acted as head of the secretariat of
Wuzhuan CMS Management Committee. This person took charge of routine CMS management activities.
4.2   Funding
The design of the scheme envisaged that of the membership premium of ¥4, 72% was required to meet
expected reimbursement, 18% as a contingency fund and 10% to meet management costs. Given the
membership of 3,355 people, the CMS generated a total revenue of ¥13,420 from this source. The county
government provided another ¥3,355 as a preventive care fund. However the county health bureau, to whom
this payment was made, did not make it available to the CMS Management Committee. Neither the township
government nor village collectives made any contribution, as previously agreed, to assist membership by poor
households. As a government employee, the ¥7,200 salary of the full-time management cadre was paid by the
county government (table 1).
Table 1:   Sources and purposes of CMS fund
Sources Purposes Amount (yuan)
Individuals outpatient care 9,662
Individuals contingency fund 2,416
Individuals management fee 1,342
Government preventive care *3,355
Government salary of full-time manager **7,200
Government prescription and invoice publication costs **1,342
Source: Wuzhuan CMS Management Committee
Notes: * Donglan County Government provided  ¥3,355 yuan to the county health bureau for
     preventive care, but this was not passed to the CMS Management Committee.
** not included in the original CMS design
4.3   Equipment and related expenditures
The county health bureau published CMS regulations, cards for each household covered, prescription forms
for the five village doctors, and invoices for the management committee. To demonstrate its support of CMS,
Hechi Prefectural Health Bureau provided financial support for the five village health stations to purchase
drug cabinets, desks and chairs, and some basic medical equipment, such as sphygmomanometer,
stethoscope, and steriliser.
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4.4   Coverage of the CMS
There were 1,828 households in the five villages, of which 984 (54%), participated in the CMS. The total de-
jure population was 8,028, of which nearly one third had left home to seek employment in the city (da-gong).
Of the 5,621 remaining, 3,355 (59.7%) were covered by CMS. There were major differences between
villages (table 2). Coverage ranged from 79% of households in Lale to less than 40% in Baxue. One possible
explanatory factor was that Lale was a small village of 160 households in a single valley, while Baxue was
considerably larger and spread over several valleys. Many villagers were not interested in CMS because their
houses were closer to other health facilities than to their own village health station.
Table 2:   Coverage of CMS in Wuzhuan
Village number of
households
households
covered by
CMS
households
covered (%)
population population
covered by
CMS
population
covered (%)
Baxue 471 160 34.0 1430 539 37.7
Shangxu 367 197 53.7 1128 668 59.2
Nalie 334 223 66.8 998 685 68.6
Linle 496 277 55.8 1559 1071 68.7
Lale 160 127 79.4 506 392 77.5
Total 1828 984 53.8 5621 3355 59.7
Source: Wuzhuan CMS Management Committee
Data from the household interview health surveys in Shanxu and Nalie, indicated that coverage was quite
similar for men and women (table 3). For female villagers, there was also little difference in coverage
between age groups, while for male villagers the differences were statistically significant, with the highest
levels for those 60 and over. This may relate to a higher demand for services by the aged, but probably also
reflects the respect given to male elders.
Table 3:   CMS members and non-members by sex and age
Age group Male
covered
Male not
covered
Female
covered
Female not
covered
Total
covered
Total not
covered
0-6 71 42 73 29 144 71
7-14 137 79 126 74 263 153
15-59 469 205 500 192 969 397
60+ 76 21 80 29 156 50
Total 753 347 779 324 1352 671
Source: 1997 Household interview health survey
The sampled households were allocated to an income category based on their net income per capita in 1993.
In 1985, the State Council defined rural inhabitants with per capita net income below ¥150 as extremely poor
(State Council, 1989). Using the overall consumer price index for rural residents (State Statistical Bureau
1994), this extreme poverty line was adjusted to give ¥302 in 1993. Households with per capita net income
less than this figure are specified as the low income group. The State Council Leading Group of the Anti-
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Poverty Programme assessed the net income per capita of all rural residents in poor counties as ¥488 in 1993
(Chen 1994). Sample households with a net income per capita greater than 150% of this figure, i.e. ¥732, are
here treated as the high income group. The middle income group thus contains households with per capita net
incomes greater than ¥302 and less than ¥732. On this basis, it was found that there were major differences
in terms of CMS coverage between income groups, with around half of the high income group joining, just
over one quarter of the middle group and only 3 out of 32 poor households (table 4).
Table 4:   member and non-member households net income per capita
Net income per capita
(yuan)
member households non-member households
<302 3 29
303-731 24 68
>732 29 33
Total 56 130
Source: 1994 and 1997 follow-up household interview health survey
4.5   Benefits from the CMS
There were 4,774 visits to the five CMS village doctors, an average of 2.2 visits per member per year. This
varied from 0.6 and 0.7 in Lale and Linle, to 3.1 in Shangxu (table 4). This was partly a reflection of the
confidence which local farmers had in the Shangxu doctor, who provided a full-time service, as compared to
the less popular doctors of Lale and Linle who only practised on a part-time basis. In the latter village, it was
found that a number of CMS members preferred to use other rural doctors even though this meant that they
could not claim reimbursement. By the end of October 1996, reimbursements for outpatient care totalled
¥6,969, an average of ¥2.08 per member. The level of reimbursement is directly related to the number of
visits, and thus the comparable rates were highest in Shangxu, ¥3.73, and lowest in Lale, ¥0.8 (table 5).
Table 5:   Reimbursement for outpatient care services by village
Nalie Baxue Shangxu Linle Lale Total
outpatient visits 955 867 2,053 777 1240 4775
annual visits per member 1.4 *1.9 3.1 0.7 *0.6 *2.2
total reimbursement (yuan) 1,543 1,464 2,492 1,310 158 6968
reimbursement per member 2.25 *3.3 3.73 1.22 *0.8 2.21
Source: Wuzhuan CMS Management Committee
Note: *Annualised estimates based on part year data:
Baxue: January 1996--October 1996, 10 months
Lale: April 1996--October 1996, 6 months
Unlike the registration fees, reimbursement of injection and treatment fees is influenced by prescription
behaviour. Under the CMS, village doctors were encouraged to earn income from providing services as
against prescribing drugs. In 1993, drug fees amounted to 90% of total fees in village health stations  (Gu
and Yu 1995). Under CMS this was reduced to 76% (table 6).
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Table 6:   Average outpatient fee per visit and reimbursement by village
Nalie* Baxue Shangxu* Linle Lale Total
Outpatient fee per visit (yuan) 10.41 1.46 3.03 4.18 3.85 5.54
of which: (%)
   drug fee 85 80 61 67 75 76
   reimbursed three-fees 15 20 39 33 25 24
Note: * Based on the data of 1997 household interview health survey, the self-reported outpatient
 fee per visit was ¥13.45 and ¥6.26 in Nalie and Shangxu respectively.
Source: Prescriptions in the five villages
4.6   Use and balance of the CMS fund
By the end of October 1996, ¥6,968 had been reimbursed, 72% of the fund allocated to this purpose.
However, because two villages had implemented the CMS somewhat later than the others, these figures are
adjusted in table 7 to produce an annualised estimate of 77%. As can be seen from this table, the under-
utilisation was due to the low level of reimbursement in Lale and Linle, for the reasons discussed above.
Table 7:   Income and expenditure of the CMS allocated outpatient fund by village
Outpatient fund Nalie Baxue Shangxu Linle Lale Total
Income 1552 1924 1973 3084 1129 9662
Expenditure 1552 *1756.8 2492 1310 *316 *7427
Expenditure (% of income) 99 *0.89 126 42 *0.28 0.77
Source: Wuzhuan CMS Management Committee
Note: *Annualised estimates based on part year data:
Baxue: January 1996--October 1996, 10 months
Lale: April 1996--October 1996, 6 months
The high level of expenditure in Shangxu reflects two factors. The first is the popularity of the rural doctor,
and the regard in which he was held. The second, unfortunately, is that he was found to have modified his
prescribing behaviour in order to increase his income from the scheme. The 1993 study indicated that doctors
tended to over-prescribe by writing ‘Big Prescriptions’, with large quantities of drugs on each, to increase
their income from drug fees (Yu et al. 1996). After introduction of CMS, the Shangxu doctor started to write
multiple ‘Small Prescriptions’ (feng-jie-chu-fang), with smaller quantities of drugs, in order to increase
reimbursements of registration fees.
It was also found that almost all of this doctor’s prescription included injections. This was probably also
motivated by the availability of reimbursement for injection fees, but it was also the case that this practice
was in line with preferences of the local people, and probably contributed to his popularity. In focus group
discussions, many villagers claimed that injections had a more immediate effect and were much more
convenient than taking drugs orally three or four times a day.
4.7   Reimbursement procedures
Village doctors charged only for drugs when CMS members sought outpatient care. They would then claim
reimbursement for registration, treatment and injection fees from the CMS using their medical notes and
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prescription forms. The CMS manager would collect these from village health stations at the end of each
month for examination, and reimbursements could be claimed by the doctors ten days later. When
interviewed, all the village doctors indicated their acceptance of this procedure.
The management committee issued a card for each household covered by CMS, and in the evaluation
100% of member households were found to have this card. Under CMS regulations, whenever a member
visited a doctor, they were required to produce this card to avoid non-drug fee payments. In practice, this rule
was not consistently followed. Many people claimed that they had forgotten their cards, but insisted on their
rights as members. The village doctors in general did not insist on seeing the card, as they knew that their
later claim for fee reimbursement would not in practice be challenged. Both the CMS management and a
number of members reported many instances of non-members obtaining benefits as a result of this lack of
effective monitoring.
4.8   Members satisfaction with the CMS
Based on data from the household survey, 70% of 229 CMS member households interviewed expressed their
satisfaction with CMS and just 5% stated that they were dissatisfied. (table 8). Of 163 households who
claimed under the scheme, 75% expressed satisfaction as compared with 58% of those who did not claim.
Table 8:   Members’ satisfaction with the CMS
households %
Satisfied 161 0.70
Neutral 51 22
Not satisfied 11 5
No comments 6 3
Total 229 100
Source: 1997 Household Interview Health Survey
The most common reason given by those who did join the CMS, 61% of the 135 households interviewed,
was that they did not understand the system. Only 12% said that they were unwilling to participate (table 9).
Table 9:   Reason for not participating in the CMS
households %
Not understanding CMS 83 61
Not willing to join 16 12
Not expressing an opinion 36 27
Total 135 100
Source: 1997 Household Interview Health Survey.
4.9   Utilisation of village outpatient services
The percentage of people reporting illness during the two weeks prior to the survey was similar for CMS
members and non-members at around 10% (table 10). There were, however, major differences in utilisation
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of outpatient care services. The number of visits to a health worker per 100 persons by members was 13.7 as
compared to 8.6 for non-members. This was in large part due to a much higher utilisation of village health
stations by members, which was only partly offset by the greater use of private practitioners by non-members.
These results would seem to indicate that the CMS provided a considerable incentive to use the associated
village health station.
Table 10:   Illness and consultation rates in prior two weeks for members and non-members
CMS members Non-CMS members
percentage of people reporting illness 10.7 8.9
number of visits to a health worker per 100 13.7 8.6
of which:
  private practitioner 0.8 3.6
  village health station 11.6 3.6
  township health centre 1.0 1.2
  county hospital 0.3 0.0
total number interviewed 1002 661
Source: 1997 Household Interview Health Survey.
The percentage of people who reported an illness but did not seek medical care was 16% for CMS members
as compared to 38% for non-members (table 11). For both groups, the most common reason given for not
visiting a health worker was ‘self-treatment with western drugs or traditional medicine’. Only 12% of
members and 9% of non-members blamed ‘financial difficulty’.
Table 11:   Those reporting illness but not visiting a health worker
CMS members Non CMS members
Reporting illness 107 60
Reporting illness but not visiting health worker 17 23
Percentage not visiting health worker 15.9 38.3
Source: 1997 Household Interview Health Survey
Analysis of the data on 56 CMS member households interviewed in both 1994 and 1997 indicated that the
number of visits to a village health station per 100 persons increased from 11.3 to 14.3. The percentage
reporting illness but not visiting a health worker decreased from 17.5% to 6.1%.
4.10   Outpatient fees at village level
The average self-reported outpatient fees per visit were ¥9.4 and ¥13.7 for CMS members and non-members
respectively (table 12). For the village health station, the corresponding figures were ¥7.7 and ¥17.3 yuan.
This would appear to indicate that the monitoring of village doctors introduced as a by-product of the CMS
reimbursement system may have had an impact in terms of cost control.
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Table 12:   Self-reported outpatient fee per visit: members and non-members (yuan)
members non-members
fee visits fee visits
Private practitioner 12.9 8 10.4 24
Village health station 7.7 116 17.3 24
Township health centre 22.8 10 14.6 9
Total 9.4 137 13.7 57
Number interviewed 1002 661
Source: 1997 Household Interview Health Survey.
For those member households interviewed in both 1994 and 1997, the average outpatient fee per visit to a
village health station was reported as falling from ¥17.2 to ¥9.4 yuan (table 13). For the corresponding
households not covered by CMS, the fee per visit increased from ¥17.8 to ¥20.2.
Table 13:   Outpatient fee per visit by households followed up from 1994 survey (yuan)
1994 1997
members non-members members non-members
Village health station 17.2 17.8 9.4 20.2
Township health centre 7.9 14.6 21.3 14.6
Total 16.9 15.7 10.1 14.3
Visits to a health worker 49 51 46 51
Households followed up 56 130 56 130
Population in households 282 625 266 627
Source: 1994 and 1997 household interview surveys.
To allow for the possibility that some rural doctors were encouraging repeated visits by CMS members, the
total fees paid per person over the two weeks prior to the survey was also calculated. For the village health
station, the average cost per person for CMS members was ¥11.4, while for non-members the equivalent
figure was ¥27.6.
4.11   Health management information at village health station
Prior to the implementation of the CMS, the village health station maintained few records. There were no
medical notes on outpatient visits, and no invoices or receipts for drug prescriptions and fees. For CMS
purposes, a special prescription form was introduced which combined these items, recording information
which included the patient’s name, sex, CMS card number, diagnosis, prescribed drugs, and fees. One copy
was kept by the village doctor and another was handed to the CMS management committee to claim
reimbursement. This form was welcomed by CMS members, who indicated that it helped them understand
their illness, treatment, and outpatient fees. It also provided a management tool which could be used to
monitor utilisation and treatment, providing a potential basis for influencing both provider behaviour and
outpatient fees.
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4.12   Utilisation of immunisation services
According to routine township health centre reports, the immunisation coverage for Wuzhan in 1995 was
92%, and the cold-chain was conducted three times (as compared to the six required by the Ministry of
Health). After the implementation of CMS in 1996, reported coverage remained at the same level, and the
cold-chain was conducted four times. The lack of improvement was attributed to the absence of effective
incentives for preventive health workers. Those at county level were not keen to distribute vaccines from the
prefecture to township health centres while those at the township level did not wish to visit rural households,
preferring to allocate their time to the more profitable curative care.
Following the implementation of the CMS, additional funds were made available to support
immunisation and maternal care. Although the money provided for this purpose had been retained by the
county health bureau, the CMS management committee decided to use the contingency and management cost
funds to finance preventive care. The heads of the county anti-epidemic and maternal and child health stations
agreed that the fund provided by the CMS would be sufficient for free provision of immunisation and
maternal care for members, and they promised to strengthen their activities in Wuzhuan. However, there was
no obvious improvement by the time of the evaluation one year later.
The one preventive health worker at Wuzhuan Township Health Centre did not undertake routine visits
to rural households, as his predecessors would have done in the 1960s and 1970s. He remained at the health
centre, requiring farmers to bring their children for vaccination. As a result, some children were not
vaccinated at all, while others received only some of those required. There was also some evidence that local
people did not fully understand the importance of immunisation. When interviewed, some farmers said that
their children did not need to be immunised because they were healthy. Clearly there was considerable scope
for preventive health education.
4.13   Utilisation of maternal care services
No pregnant women in the villages used the maternal care services available at the health stations because all
the five village doctors were male. Local women reported that they were unwilling to see a male doctor for
maternal care even though the doctors had received training and had some basic medical equipment. They
preferred an experienced older woman as mid-wife This was consistent with findings by Kaufman and others
(1997), who argued that lack of female doctors was one of the most important constraints to reproductive
health service utilisation in many of the poor rural areas of China.
5   CONCLUSION
Are community financing schemes worthwhile and feasible in poor rural China? This question has been
keenly debated by health managers, researchers, and decision-makers (Liu et al 1996). The present study
would seem on balance to suggest that they are. One year after implementation, utilisation of outpatient
services at village level by CMS members had increased, there was evidence of reduced costs and the
management of village health services had  been strengthened. The CMS premium, ¥4 per member, was less
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than 0.5% of the annual net income per capita, and thus affordable for a large majority of local farmers. Over
70% of sampled households which participated in the CMS expressed their satisfaction. Both local
government and farmers agreed to continue to implement CMS, and by early 1997 sufficient funds had been
raised for a second year.
The CMS also appears to have provided at least a useful first step towards more rational drug use by
village doctors, controlling the growth of health care fees and encouraging the provision of additional
services. The establishment of a reimbursement scheme and associated performance related bonus system
(even though very limited in scope) has lead to the introduction of a simple but apparently useful monitoring
procedure which can be used to regulate the activities of health providers, even though the extent of such
regulation appears at present to be fairly restricted. In addition, village doctors are now required to purchase
drugs only from the township health centre, mainly to prevent the use of drug traders which might
compromise the quality of supply. Again, this limitation to a single source of supply could facilitate the
introduction of additional procedures for the monitoring and control of prescribing behaviour.
On the other hand, the scheme failed to improve the provision or utilisation of immunisation and
maternal care services. The incentives to health workers to actively promote preventive services clearly
proved insufficient. While they were willing to provide these services at the health station, they were not
prepared to travel to rural households, as this would have reduced the time available for the provision of
financially more rewarding curative services. Similarly, they did not seem to regard health education as an
activity to which they should allocate time, and in focus group discussions simply reported that they were
discouraged by the lack of interest in preventive services by local people.
The implementation of CMS clearly requires considerable support from the county government level to
ensure appropriate inputs of personnel, equipment and funds. However, the experience in Wuzhuan would
suggest that, given the relative autonomy of other institutions, this may not be sufficient. Money provided by
the county government to the county health bureau for preventive services was not used for that purpose.
Similarly, neither the township government nor any village collectives fulfilled their stated intentions to
provide support for poor household to join the scheme.
The survival of the scheme will also depend on continued support from the general population, who
provide most of the revenue. At the moment they are expressing satisfaction, but it is clearly too early to say
if this will be maintained. There have been many attempts to reintroduce CMS schemes in poor areas since
their initial collapse. None have proved sustainable in the medium term. It could be argued that the benefits
of this particular scheme are so limited that many people will eventually begin to wonder if membership is
really worthwhile, particularly if they experience a situation in which they have to pay high drug fees which
are not covered. It should be clearly recognised that the improved information and monitoring procedures
described above, though worthwhile and perhaps initially attractive, are unlikely, in themselves, to persuade
people to join or continue membership.
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Management of the scheme will also need to be improved if confidence is to be maintained. There are
strong indications that procedures designed to restrict reimbursements to members were not strictly enforced.
If the perception grows that the benefits can be enjoyed without payment of the premium the scheme could
run into serious problems. It is also not clear to what extent quality monitoring is really undertaken, or how
this might be achieved, given that this would seem to require at least some capacity for assessing the clinical
performance of health workers. The enforcement of strict adherence to established treatment protocols would
be a possibility, but would raise many additional problems as to competence.
Establishment of a CMS cannot in itself overcome basic deficiencies in service provision. In Wuzhuan,
a mountainous area in which travel can be both difficult and time consuming, not every village had a rural
doctor. Again, in a region in which women were not prepared to seek maternal care services from a man,
there was a complete absence of female rural doctors. Perhaps of more general relevance, Wuzhuan again
demonstrates the difficulties of providing access to the poorest households. Even with the apparently
extremely modest premium of ¥4 per person, which many would indeed see as far too low to provide a
reasonable level of services, the CMS managed to attract only a handful of households with per capita
incomes below the poverty line. Given the perhaps reasonable reluctance of relatively poor village collectives
and townships to assist such households to join CMS schemes it would seem that funding from a higher level
may be the only possible means of achieving this objective.
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Figure 1:   Evaluation framework
Selected indicators
Inputs staff, budget, equipment
Outputs
CMS coverage overall coverage rate, proportion of CMS members by sex and
age-group
Benefit from CMS number of members enjoying reimbursement for outpatient
services
number of outpatient visits reimbursed per member,
reimbursement of outpatient fees per member
Revenue allocated for and actual
expenditure on curative and preventive
services
revenue allocated for curative and preventive services
actual expenditure on curative and preventive services
Well administrated membership system proportion of households with CMS cards
Correctly functioning reimbursement system proportion of members carrying CMS card to visit a village
doctor, proportion of non-members obtaining reimbursement,
average time for village doctors to claim fees
Satisfaction of members percent of members satisfied with scheme for:
 all members
 those who had not received reimbursement 
Purpose
Increased access to village outpatient care percent of members and non-members reporting illness in
previous two weeks
number of outpatient visits per 100 members and non-members
number of outpatient visits to village health station per 100
members and non-members
percent of members and non-members reporting illness but not
seeking medical care
utilisation of outpatient care by member before and after CMS
introduced
evaluation of medical practice at village level
Reduced cost of village outpatient care expenditure per village outpatient visit by members and non-
members
expenditure per visit at village level by members before and after
CMS introduced
Increased access to immunisation immunisation rates before and after CMS
Increased access to maternal care proportion of pregnant women receiving ante-natal care/delivery
care/post-natal care before and after CMS introduced
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Figure 2. Evaluation indicators
Selected indicators Outcomes
Inputs
staff one doctor at each of the five villages of CMS; nine part-time
preventive health workers; one full-time manager
revenue ¥13,420 received from individuals
(full-time manager’s salary , ¥7,200, and equipment costs,  ¥1342,
provided by county government)
equipment CMS cards, prescriptions, and invoices
Outputs
coverage rate 54% of households
60% of population;
distribution of members by sex 69% for males
71% for females
distribution of members by age 65% of those aged less than 15
71% of those aged 15-59
76% for those aged 60 and over
distribution of members by household
income*
47% of households with income greater than ¥732 per capita
26.09 of households with income in range ¥303-731 per capita
9.38 of households with incomes less than ¥302 per capita
members obtaining reimbursement 4,744
outpatient visits reimbursed per member 1.4
reimbursement of outpatient fees/member ¥2.21 (40% of outpatient fees per member)
revenue allocated for curative services, and
actual expenditure
¥9,662 allocated
¥6,968 (72%) expended.
revenue available for preventive services,
and actual expenditure
no revenue or expenditure
proportion of households with CMS cards 100%
proportion of members holding a CMS card
to visit a village doctor
reports that many individuals obtained reimbursement without
presenting a card but no quantitative estimates were obtained
proportion of non-CMS members to people
enjoying outpatient services reimbursement
reports that non-members enjoying reimbursement, but no
quantitative estimates were obtained
average time for village doctors to claim
fees
10 days after submitting prescriptions
percent of members satisfied with scheme 70% for all members
58% for those not receiving reimbursement
* Estimates derived from those households followed-up from 1994.
(continued on next page)
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Figure 2:   Evaluation indicators (continued)
Purposes
percent of members and non-members
reporting illness in previous two weeks
10.7% for members
8.9% for non-members
outpatient visits per 100 members and non-
members
13.7% for members
8.6% for non-members
number of outpatient visits to village health
station per 100 members and non- members
11.6% for members
3.6% for non-members
percent of members and non-members
reporting illness but not seeking care
15.9% for members
38.3% for non-members
number of outpatient visits per 100 member
before and after CMS introduced
11.3% before CMS introduced
14.3% after introduction
quality of medical procedures at village
level
improved practice from an absence of medical notes, receipts, and
invoices to routine availability of these items
average expenditure per village outpatient
visit by members and non-members
¥7.7 for members
¥17.3 for non-members
expenditure per visit at village level by
members before and after CMS introduced
¥17.2 before CMS introduced
¥9.4 after introduction
immunisation rates before and after CMS no change
proportion of pregnant women receiving
ante-natal care/delivery care/post-natal care
before and after CMS introduced
no change
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APPENDIX I
DESIGN OF COOPERATIVE HEALTH CARE SCHEME IN WUZHUAN TOWNSHIP
1   Objectives
1.1   To guarantee access to basic health care by farmers, especially the poor, including outpatient services at
village level, part of inpatient services at township level, immunization services for children, aged 0-7, and
ante-natal services for pregnant women
1.2   To make better use of the health resources at township and village level
2   Design
2.1   Principles
· to raise fund from multiple resources under the leadership of the local government, such as
· government, collectives, and individuals, but mainly from the individuals
· to run the CMS for non-profit, and to keep expenditure below income
· to calculate the fund by a village as a unit, and to manage it by a township as a unit
· to participate the CMS voluntarily by a household as a unit
· to make use of the fund fairly and reasonably
· to publish the CMS account regularly for public inspection
2.2   Members covered
All rural residents in Wuzhuan township may voluntarily participate.
2.3   Services covered
· outpatient services at village health station
· immunization services for children, aged 0-7
· ante-natal care services for pregnant women
2.4   Payment for health care services
2.4.1   Prepayment
If households participate in the CMS and pay premiums, they may enjoy free immunization services for their
children, free ante-natal care services for pregnant women, and partial reimbursement of outpatient service fees at the
village health station.
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2.4.2   Fee-for-services
If a member covered by the CMS visits a health worker at village health station, he/she will only pay drug fees,
charged at specified retail prices. Medical care fees, including registration, treatment, and injection fees, will be paid
from the CMS fund.
Prior to CMS implementation village doctors sold drugs with a mark-up of 10-17% for Western drugs
and 20-25% for traditional Chinese drugs. After CMS, they will pay one third of the difference of specified
drug wholesale and retail prices to the CMS management committee, which will re-distribute this as a
performance related bonus.
2.5   Calculation of the CMS fund
2.5.1   Fund for immunization and ante-natal care
According to data provided by the Anti-Epidemic Station of Donglan County, in 1994 it cost ¥12,000 for each
round of the immunisation cold-chain in the whole county. There should be six rounds per year, and Donglan has a
population of 270,000. The annual cost is thus ¥0.27 per capita.
In order to encourage rural health workers to undertake immunization, allowances were provided. Each
village covered by the CMS has a health station. When the health workers of a station complete each round of
immunization services for their village, they will be given ¥40. There are 11 villages in Wuzhuan township,
with a population of 16,000. This implies an annual expenditure of ¥0.17 per capita.
Allowing for inflation of 20% this gives a total annual requirement of ¥0.53 per capita.
A village health worker who provides three medical examinations to a pregnant woman will receive an
allowance of ¥5. The same amount will be paid to a worker who makes 3 visits to a woman who has recently
given birth. Attendance at the birth itself will entail a payment of ¥15. A total of ¥25 is therefore required to
provide services for each birth. With a birth rate of 20 per 1,000, there are some 320 babies born in
Wuzhuan each year. The total cost per annum is thus around ¥0.5 per capita.
The annual allowance for immunization and ante-natal services was therefore set at ¥1 per capita.
2.5.2   Fund for curative outpatient care at village level
The household interview health survey carried out in 1994 indicated that, including private practitioners and
collective health posts at village level, the annual outpatient care fee was ¥28.8 per capita, of which 10% was for
medical care fees, and 90% drug fees. Thus the average annual outpatient care fee to be reimbursed by the CMS was
around ¥2.88 per capita.
Setting the related premium at ¥4 per capita allows for ¥0.4 as a management fee and ¥0.72 to be
allocated to a contingency fund. It was found that the annual growth rate of outpatient fees at township level
in Donglan County was 18%. If this figure was taken as an estimate for the annual growth rate of outpatient
fees at village level, the 25% ratio of contingency fund to outpatient fee allocation would seem reasonable.
The management fee of ¥0.40 per member is around 10% of the total premium.
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2.6   Sources of the CMS fund
2.6.1   County and township governments
The government is responsible for providing financial support for the provision of preventive services to rural
residents. The fund for immunization and ante-natal care, ¥1 per capita, will therefore be raised from governments at
both county and township level.
2.6.2   Collectives
There are poor households (Five-Guarantee Households) in Wuzhuan, who cannot afford to pay CMS premiums.
The Villagers Committee will be responsible for payment of these premiums from the village collective fund.
2.6.3   Households
Household will join the CMS as a unit, paying the premium of ¥4 per capita.
2.7   Management of the fund
The Wuzhuan Township CMS Management Committee will be responsible for fund management. The committee
will open a special bank account to deposit the fund. Each village covered by the CMS will have its own fund
management record book, which will be used by the committee to record revenues and expenditures.
2.8   Control of drug use and cost
2.8.1  Drug purchase and distribution
The township management committee will be responsible for purchasing and distributing drugs for all the villages
covered by the CMS. The village health station must not purchase drugs from any other source. Each village health
station must stock 80 essential drugs.
2.8.2   Drug price and profit
The village health workers must sell drugs to patients at the prices set by the management committee. These will be
posted on the wall of village health station for public inspection.
Village doctors will pay one-third of the price difference between wholesale and retail drug to the
management committee. By the end of each year, the village management groups and the township
management committee will evaluate the performance of village health workers, and pay a bonus to those
who do well in terms of quality and quantity of health services.
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2.9   Management organization
2.9.1   Village CMS management group
Each village will establish a CMS management group. It will consists of the head of the village, the secretary of the
village Communist Party Committee, the village accountant, the head of the village women’s committee, and three
representatives of the villagers.
This group will have a number of responsibilities, including:
· collecting premium from individual households
· handing the premium to the township management committee
· listening to public opinion
· monitoring the village health workers' performance on the basis of management rules
· evaluating the performance of health workers by the end of each year
2.9.2   Township CMS management committee
Wuzhuan Township CMS Management Committee will be directed by the head of the township. It will include
representatives from relevant government sectors, such as civil affair, financing and health. There will be a
secretariat attached to the committee. The head of this secretariat will be a full-time manager of the CMS.
The committee will be responsible for:
· calculating the CMS fund
· making decision on collection, distribution, and use of the CMS fund
· purchasing drugs for village health stations
· listing the prices of essential drugs and posting these at the village health stations
· collecting 1/3 of the drug mark-up from village health workers
· monitoring the provision of preventive and curative health care by the village health workers
· evaluating the performance of the village health workers, taking into account the opinions of the village
management groups, and paying bonuses
· formulating CMS management regulations and rules.
2.8   Payment for village health workers
At the end of every month, village health workers will hand their outpatient records for inspection by the
management committee, which will reimburse registrations, injections, and treatment fees. They may charge drug fee
when they see patients. Two-thirds of the drug mark-up may be retained.
When village health workers undertake immunization or ante-natal care, they should record this activity
on both their own report forms and the CMS card of each household. The management committee will pay
allowances to them on the basis of these records.
At the end of each year, the management committee will assess the work of village health workers, and
pay bonuses on the basis of the quality and quantity of services provided by them.
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ANNEX II:   CMS PRESCRIPTION FORM
No. CMS card.......
Name..... Sex.... Age... Home address...
Diagnosis....
Drugs prescribed ...........
Date:.......... Doctor ..........(Signature)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fees:
Registration fee...
Injection fee ....
Treatment fee ....
sub-total
Drug fee ....
Total
